Shale gas in Australia: the policy options by Stevens, P et al.
GREEN PAPER
UCL International Energy Policy Institute 
Adelaide, AUSTRALIA
October 2013
SHALE GAS  
IN AUSTRALIA:  
THE POLICY  
OPTIONS
Photo: Andy Rasheed, courtesy Santos
2 of 32
3 of 32
About UCL Australia
University College London (UCL) is one of the world’s leading research universities. 
Founded in 1826, UCL was the first London university. In 2010 it became the first 
major British university to establish an international campus, opening UCL Australia in 
the South Australian capital of Adelaide.  UCL Australia has three academic units; the 
UCL School of Energy and Resources, Australia; the UCL International Energy Policy 
Institute; and the Mullard Space Science Laboratory (Australia).
UCL Australia was founded with major funding donations from Santos, BHP Billiton 
and the Government of South Australia.  It draws further funding from private and 
public programmes and a number of power and energy companies.
About the IEPI
University College London established the UCL International Energy Policy Institute  
(IEPI) in 2012, giving it a mission to consider global issues surrounding investment in  
power generation technologies where liberalised power markets are operating  
under carbon constraints. 
This focus includes the complex interactions and implications of technical, legal, 
financial and environmental effects on power generation.  IEPI also examines the role of 
governments in energy technology investment and the positive and negative impacts 
on resource-rich nations – including the ‘resource curse’. 
Value-adding to energy resources and assets, particularly global uranium production, 
the unconventional gas revolution and renewable energy, are also focal points for the 
research programme – particularly the impact of policy setting on communities, the 
environment and energy transmission.
Creative Commons licence
All material in this publication is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Australia 3.0 Licence,  
save for content supplied by third parties and logos.
Creative Commons Attribution Australia 3.0 Licence is a standard form licence agreement that allows  
you to copy, distribute, transmit and adapt this publication provided you attribute the work. A summary  
of the licence terms is available from creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/au/deed.en. The full licence  
terms are available from creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/au/legalcode.
This publication (and any material sourced from it) should be attributed as:  
‘SHALE GAS IN AUSTRALIA: THE POLICY OPTIONS,  
UCL AUSTRALIA Green paper 2013. CC BY Aus 3.0’ and linked to the original source.
UCL Australia does not endorse future authors or work in which original text is used.
Contact
UCL Australia, Torrens Building, 220 Victoria Square, Adelaide, South Australia, 5000, Tel: +61 8 8110 9960, Fax: +61 8 8212 3039
4 of 32
Executive summary
Australia has substantial unconventional gas resources. 
However, unlike the US shale revolution, which is now well established, Australian 
states and territories are yet to collectively answer the question as to how far 
they want to exploit these unconventional assets. This is especially true within 
the portfolio of “shale gas deposits” (a term being used that also includes other 
formations, such as tight sands).  
Currently, there are a number of diverse and non-specific regulatory measures that 
companies involved in the nascent shale gas industry are operating under, some with 
more success and openness than others. Furthermore, following the Australian federal 
election on 7 September, 2013, the new Industry Minister Ian Macfarlane moved 
quickly to encourage resource companies to ‘use or lose’ their development rights 
and committed to a new Energy White Paper within a year. Hence, this green paper 
focusses exclusively on the specific shale gas component of the Australian picture by 
considering the characteristics of international shale developments, including the US, to 
provide considered thinking for resource stakeholders in the new public policy debate. 
A major recommendation is that, for Australia to realise its shale gas potential, the 
regulatory regime should be reconsidered and refocused to provide a greater degree of 
clarity, transparency and community engagement. 
Geology
This green paper provides a special section on geology, since the Australian shale 
geology is unique, challenging and, on the whole, not naturally conducive to familiar 
shale extraction technologies.  It accepts that while the geology cannot be changed, 
there are opportunities for policy to enable improvements in recovery that can enhance 
its commerciality. 
Policy
This green paper suggests that, in addition to geology, there are three substantial policy 
issues to be addressed should Australia wish to expedite its shale gas development. 
This includes creating:
1. a larger and more competitive service industry;
2. improved gas pipe connectivity and access and;
3. wider community engagement and more inclusive governance frameworks.
This green paper finds that a well constituted shale gas industry could lead to reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions and increased energy security. The use of shale gas for 
Australian electricity generation could reduce the projected CO2 emission level for 2020 
by about 14 per cent. The involvement of more shale gas operators could lead to an 
increase in domestic gas supply. However, the success of the shale gas industry will 
largely depend on collaboration between industry, governments and local communities. 
Finally, the development of a shale gas service industry could, given the large shale gas 
interest in Asia, provide a valuable source of export revenue for Australia.
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This green paper suggests 10 areas for debate:
1. State and Territory governments should fund the greater use of seismic (2D and 3D) data    
 banks to verify lucrative areas for shale gas production and use this and a “use it or    
 lose it” focus to prioritise shale gas projects based on the best resource basins. 
2. The development of a larger and more competitive service industry for drilling and fraccing   
 should be encouraged, by offering a more attractive tax regime, including altering    
 capital allowances and depreciation.
3. The acute shortage of deep well “proppants” (used to keep channels propped open to allow  
 trapped oil and gas to escape) and “guar gum” (thickening agent) could be mitigated by   
 stimulating domestic supply industries, again through taxation instruments, including   
 accelerated depreciation of capital investment.
4. The disclosure of fraccing fluids could be published publicly on a well-by-well basis, to   
 enhance transparency and accountability.  
5. The formation of knowledge sharing alliances among developers and service companies   
 could be encouraged through investment and other fiscal measures.  This may increase   
 the speed of technology developments and the sharing of excessive cost burdens and   
 secure the supply of gas for domestic consumption. The Australian Government’s    
 new Exploration Development Incentive is one step towards this goal, enabling small and   
 emerging gas producers to attract investment.  The road mapping exercise in South   
 Australia (bringing stakeholders together at targeted round-table meetings) could be   
 duplicated by other states and territories. Similar alliances between emerging gas    
 producers and manufacturers may also go some way to securing gas for domestic    
 consumption, thereby securing jobs in the manufacturing sector, while avoiding a  
 reservation policy.
6. Third party access to existing pipeline infrastructure could be improved by the    
 implementation of a common carriage policy obligating pipeline owners to distribute   
 the existing pipeline capacity on a pro rata basis, even if it is fully utilized. 
7. The development of a stronger wholesale market, by implementing a trading platform   
 for unused pipeline capacity, could simplify gas transactions. Furthermore, this may enable   
 the transmission of gas directly from producers to consumers, leading to cost reductions.
8. Regulatory measures specific to shale gas operations should be contemplated in regards   
 to environmental impact management and community engagement. Disparate legislation   
 should be pulled together under a specific regime to aid transparency and ensure    
 the effective governance of shale gas operations across Australia. 
9. Obtaining social licences to operate with wider local community participation is vital for   
 any long term shale gas industry. The collaboration and understanding of stakeholders is   
 crucial to reducing barriers for development.
10. State and Federal Governments should more directly link local community employment,   
 training, economic and social programmes to unconventional gas taxation receipts.   
 New governance frameworks could be developed to enable economic and social benefits to  
 be optimized for specific impacts under both State and Federal funding disbursements.  
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The world is increasingly taking interest in the potential for a shale gas revolution.  
Australia is no exception to this trend.  The key question for Federal, State and 
local governments is, assuming a shale gas revolution is seen as desirable, what 
policy measures may be taken in order to achieve this end and what should any 
debate over shale gas policy be focusing on?  This brief paper sets the context 
for any shale gas revolution.  It then outlines the characteristics present in the US 
that were necessary for the generation of its shale gas revolution.  In the context 
of Australia, there are many barriers to reproducing these characteristics. This 
paper considers what policy options are available to reduce such barriers and 
lead Australia to its own shale revolution.
Chapter 1:  Introduction
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A brief history
The shale revolution in the US is based on the application of two main technologies 
– horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (fraccing). Neither is new technology.  
Horizontal drilling was developed in the 1930s and the first well was fracced in 
the US in 1947. The revolution has been reflected in the dramatic increase in the 
production of shale gas.  In 2000, shale accounted for less than 1 per cent of US 
domestic gas production. In 2007 it was 8 per cent and only four years later, in 
2011, it was 30 per cent. However, a key point is that this American “revolution” in 
reality happened over a long period of time – more than 20 years, although it is only 
in the last five years or so that the share of shale gas in domestic production has 
increased significantly.  Furthermore, this growing role of shale gas is expected to 
continue. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) suggests shale gas will supply 
42 per cent of domestic US gas production by 2040 and another source puts shale 
at more than 50 per cent by the 2030s [1].
The impact in the US
The impact of this shale gas revolution has been significant1. The most obvious 
impact has been on US domestic gas prices, as can be seen from Figure 1.
Figure 1
Source: US Energy Information Administration.
This dramatic fall in gas prices has had several important effects.  It has led to 
a significant revival in US petrochemical and other gas intensive manufacturing 
industries. It has also pushed coal out of much of the electricity generation, 
leading to increased coal exports and a reduction in the US’s carbon footprint.  
Internationally, it has had a significant impact on the global LNG trade.  Between 
2005 and 2009, 75 per cent of US LNG regasification capacity was built in 
anticipation of falling domestic US gas supplies. By 2011, 90 per cent of total 
capacity was idle.  At the same time, LNG export plants which had been built 
in anticipation of greater US demand, suddenly found themselves scrambling 
for alternative markets. The result was a potential oversupply of LNG leading to 
downward pressure on prices2.
1 Not least in the development of a dramatic increase in hydrocarbon liquids production.  According 
to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy for 2013, 2012 saw the largest annual increase in liquids 
production in the US since the industry began in 1859.  This, however, is not covered in this paper.
2 This was temporarily relieved as a result of the Fukushima nuclear accident that forced Japan into the 
LNG spot market.
Chapter 2:  The “Shale gas revolution” 
     in the US2
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2Why it happened in the USA key question that is relevant to the Australian story is why this shale gas revolution happened in the US?  The answer lies in the coincidence of a number of characteristics. To understand what these characteristics were will provide a guide to help understand what may be needed in Australia if the US experience is to be replicated.  They are listed in Table 1 below.Table 1: Factors creating the ‘shale gas revolution’ in the United States 
1. GEOLOGY
1. Large shallow, material plays, implying large technically recoverable resources. Also much of the shale had low clay 
content, making it easier to fracture.
2. After many years of oil and gas drilling, there was plenty of drill core data publicly available to allow explorers to find 
the ‘sweet spots’ on the plays.
3. Although not in the early days in the Barnett and the Haynesville, the shale gas in later plays had a high liquids con-
tent, which greatly enhanced the economics of the operations, especially at a time when gas prices were low.
2. RESEARCH
1. In 1982 the US government began extensive funding of R&D by the Gas Technology Institute into ‘low permeability 
hydrocarbon bearing formations’. The results were widely disseminated to the industry. 
3. REGULATION
1. The Energy Act 2005 explicitly excluded hydraulic fracturing from the Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Wa-
ter Act – the so-called ‘Cheney-Halliburton Loophole’. Thus, much of the US shale gas operations were done with little 
or no environmental impact assessments.
2. The 1980 Energy Act gave tax credits amounting to 50 cents per million British thermal units (BTUs). It also intro-
duced the Intangible Drilling Cost Expensing Rule, which covered (typically) more than 70 per cent of the well develop-
ment costs, crucial for small firms with a limited cash flow. These economic incentives were very important in the early 
stages of the industry, which was based on small, relatively cash strapped, entrepreneurial companies..
3. Property rights in the United States make the shale gas the property of the landowner, creating a strong financial 
incentive for private owners to allow the disruptions associated with shale operations. Also, the population is used to 
being in proximity to oil and gas operations.
4.The system is used to licensing large areas for exploration with fairly vague work programme commitments, which is 
what is needed when dealing with shale plays.
4. THE NATURE OF THE GAS MARKET
1. Pipeline access is based on ‘common carriage’, so gas producers at worst have at least some access to existing 
pipelines, transforming the economics of shale gas production. The US also has a very large and extensive gas pipe-
line grid to move gas around the country.
2. The US is a ‘commodity supply gas market’, i.e. a lot of buyers and sellers and good price transparency. Gas is 
easy to sell.
3.  The US domestic gas market experienced strong rising prices in the period after 2002, culminating in a price over 
$10 per thousand cubic feet (mcf) in May 2008.
5. INDUSTRY
1. The industry was dominated by small, entrepreneurial companies, the so-called ‘momma and poppa’ companies.
2. The majority of the work was done by a dynamic, highly competitive service industry. At the height of operations in 
the Barnet Play in 2008, 199 rigs were operating.
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Taken together, the characteristics listed in Table 1 explain why the shale gas 
revolution began in the US.  To a large extent their relative importance depends 
on the sequence.  The story starts with the fact of favourable geology, plus large 
amounts spent on R&D by the government. Then tax credits and drilling cost 
expensing started the actual operations, which were able to operate in a broadly 
supportive regulatory regime, especially given the 2005 exclusion of fraccing from 
the EPA’s Clean Water Act. This was in regions for the most part used to oil and 
gas operations, incentivized by the property rights and assisted by a dynamic and 
competitive service industry to drill and to hydraulically fracture. The gas market, 
both in terms of trading and transport, contributed; as did the high liquids content 
of the gas in later plays at a time when low prices might have been expected to 
slow developments. All this implies that some combination of these characteristics 
is required if the US experience is to be replicated elsewhere.
2
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The need for gas
The picture for conventional gas is given below in Table 2.  Currently, Australia is in 
the process of building seven LNG plants, in addition to the three already operating. 
Other LNG projects are in the pipeline, but given the cost inflation of LNG projects it 
seems unlikely they will get off the drawing board in the near future. All this is with a 
view to exporting some 4.24 trillion cubic feet (tcf) or 120 billion cubic metres (bcm) 
by 2035, compared to 0.88 tcf (25 bcm) in 2010, although by 2016, 1.77 tcf (50 
bcm) is expected.
Table 2 Conventional gas in Australia
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013
Whatever the numbers, there is already growing concern that Australia will not 
have sufficient gas to meet LNG plants plus growing domestic consumption.  
This has been reinforced by the government implementing policies to encourage 
greater use of gas for climate change reasons. Competition between the domestic 
and international gas demand exists, as gas producers prefer to exploit the gap 
between domestic and international LNG supply, made possible by the former 
Australian Labor Government policy prioritising exports over domestic supply. The 
new Australian conservative government of Prime Minister Tony Abbott seems to 
support a similar policy, but since winning the election on 7 September, 2013, has 
made it clear it will have its own Energy White Paper within a year.  
Domestic gas prices could be in the order of A$2.83 per thousand cubic feet of 
gas [2]. With gas producers favouring exports, domestic gas prices may experience 
upward pressure. Manufacturing industries reliant on gas as the predominant 
energy source are struggling to secure long-term contracts, due to the rapidly 
increasing LNG exports causing price insecurity in domestic gas supply. Therefore, 
the domestic gas price is projected to increase to $7-$10 within the next three 
years in both the east and west coast markets, thereby reaching parity with the 
export price level [3]. The manufacturing sector argues this will lead to a reduction 
in their competitiveness, leading to job losses. There are now calls for a moratorium 
on future LNG projects. Furthermore, this has given rise to a debate over whether 
the Australian Government should introduce a ‘reservation policy’ for the east 
coast gas market. The idea is, through some legislative intervention, a proportion of 
production will be held back for domestic use rather than export.  The suggestion 
is controversial and the petroleum industry argues it is policy interference in the 
market’s natural performance. Clearly a lot of gas will be needed in either scenario. 
The IEA’s Golden Age of Gas Report predicts that gas production will have to rise 
from 1.59 tcf (45 bcm) in 2008 to 2.97 tcf (84 bcm) by 2015 and 4.45 tcf (126 
Chapter 3: The prospects in Australia
2002 2012
Proven reserves of conventional gas (tcf) 87.5 132.8
Reserves to production ratio (years) 74.0 76.6
Production billion cubic feet per day (bcfd) 3.2 4.7
Domestic Consumption (bcfd) 2.2 2.5
Exports (bcfd) 1.0 2.2
3
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3 bcm) by 2020 [4].  Of this, in 2008 some 10 per cent came from unconventional gas, however this will need to rise to 45 per cent by 2035, the majority being made up of coal bed methane. However, Australian LNG exports to the Asian market may have to compete with the LNG exports from North America, Qatar and East Africa beyond 2018 with growing natural gas developments [5]. It should also be remembered that most conventional gas resources in Australia are offshore  (Figure 2), more expensive to develop and far from regional markets, despite  as-yet-unproven ships being built with LNG processing plants (FLNG). This suggests that increased shale gas production could play a valuable role in Australia’s energy future.
Figure 2
Source: Geoscience Australia
The potential resources
Australia clearly has shale gas resources. In April 2011, the US’s Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) estimated Australia’s technically recoverable resources at 
396 tcf based on an assessment of four basins. These are divided between the 
Canning (229 tcf), the Cooper (85 tcf), the Perth (59 tcf), and the Maryborough basins 
(23 tcf).In its latest Energy Outlook of June 2013, the estimate had increased to 
437 tcf. Geoscience Australia gives a figure of 388 tcf. These figures compare with 
estimates of recoverable proven reserves of conventional gas from Table 2 of 132.8 
tcf, although it is important to remember that technically recoverable resources are 
very different from proven reserves.  In the US, the rule of thumb used is that, of the 
technically recoverable resources, some 10 per cent are likely to be produced.  At 
some 40 tcf this is still a significant asset.
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Developments so far
The first exploratory vertical (Holdfast -1) and horizontal (Holdfast -2) wells aimed 
at shale gas were drilled in 2010 and 2013 by Beach Energy in the Cooper Basin, 
South Australia. The first commercial shale gas development was initiated in 2012 
by Santos with the Moomba-191 vertical shale well. The initial well flow rates 
ranged from 1.000 million cubic feet per day (mmcf/d)  to 2.600 mmcf/d [6]. These 
rates are in line with the successful North American shale development rates [7]. 
DrillSearch Energy and Senex Energy are also operating on Cooper Basin shales. 
The Cooper Basin shale play is projected to grow up to 70 wells by 2015 and up 
to 2500 wells in total by 2028, recovering some 6.0 tcf [8]. This is mainly due to the 
Cooper Basin being the most productive area to conduct shale gas development 
because of existing pipeline infrastructure and processing facilities. However, even 
in the Cooper Basin there are no paved access roads after 50 years of operation. 
The other basins around Australia have also shown increasing activity in terms 
of exploration and seismic studies. AWE operating in the Perth Basin, Western 
Australia, has reported shale well production rates around 0.35 mmcf/d [9]. Local 
companies have partnered with international companies to gain access to the 
capital, technology and skilled personnel required for shale gas operations. In the 
Canning Basin, PetroChina, Conocophilips, BG, Hess and Mitsubishi are operating 
alongside local companies Buru Energy and New Standard Energy. Chevron 
and BG are operating alongside Beach Energy and others in the Cooper Basin, 
while Central Petroleum, Stat Oil, Armour Energy, PetroFrontier, Blue Energy and 
Australian Oil and Gas are operating on the shale gas assets of Georgina basin in 
the Northern Territory. However, Australian shale wells are yet to be fully tested with 
horizontal drilling and fracturing. 
3
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In May 2013, University College London ran an executive training programme on 
The Shale Gas Revolution and Australia: Threats and Opportunities in Adelaide. 
During the programme, participants, all of whom were involved in Australian gas 
operations in various forms, were asked to rate what they saw as the key barriers 
to the development of shale in Australia, based on the factors listed in Table 1. Four 
key challenges emerged3. The respondents saw the main barrier as the lack of 
favorable geology. The three other top barriers were seen as the lack of a dynamic 
and competitive service industry, access to pipelines and the environmental lobby.  
This view is also supported by findings of our own ongoing research on shale gas 
developments and comparisons with the US shale gas industry. The four challenges 
are described in the following sections.
Geology
The Cooper Basin, South Australia has the most developed infrastructure, but, 
being Lacustrine (“of a lake”), rather than marine (“of a sea”), in origin, it is not 
a conventional shale play. It is known as a “basin centred” gas play, since the 
formations are siltstone rather than real shale, similar to the Barnett shale play in 
Texas [10]. Formations are also deeper and have higher clay and CO2 contents. 
This will lead to a reduction in the CH4 content of the produced gas, leading to 
lower economic benefits. Therefore, the effectiveness of using similar technology 
to develop shale gas resources in Australia is questionable, with no guarantee of 
long-term success.  Australian shale plays are also subjected to higher tectonic 
stresses compared to North American shale plays. Therefore, Australian shale gas 
success will be mainly based on finding the best formations with liquid content to 
get the maximum economies of scale. Higher liquid content will provide the funding 
necessary for the infrastructure required to initiate the shale gas production in these 
isolated basins. However, currently there is no prioritising of shale gas projects 
based on the best basins, mainly due to a lack in seismic data (2D and 3D) required 
to verify more lucrative areas for shale gas production. The estimated ultimate 
recovery (EUR) is a useful guide to understanding the resource potential of a shale 
gas well. As illustrated in Table 3, Australian shale plays have shown a similar 
resource richness compared to US shales. For US shales, resource richness over 
2.0 billion cubic feet (bcf)/km2 often led to higher EUR. 
4
Chapter 4: The challanges to developing   
    shale gas in Australia
3 Of course this can hardly be described as a “scientific sample” but at least it provides some insights 
as to what the perceived barriers might be.
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Table 3: Resource richness of US shale plays and Australian shale plays 4Shale play Recoverable  gas resource  (bcf/km2) Estimated ultimate recovery (bcf/well)US shale playsBarnett 2.59 1.42
Barnett Woodford 4.61 3.07
Cana Woodford 3.20 5.20
Eagle Ford 7.37 5.00
Fayetteville 1.37 2.07
Haynesville 3.21 3.57
Lewis 0.60 1.30
Mancos 1.23 1.00
Marcellus 1.67 1.18
Woodford 1.82 2.98
Australian shale plays
Amadeus 2.19 N/A
Beetaloo 2.62 N/A
Bonaparte 1.60 N/A
Bowen 1.89 N/A
Canning 2.48 N/A
Cooper 3.79 N/A
Georgina 2.91 N/A
Maryborough 2.33 N/A
Mcarthur 2.91 N/A
Otway 2.19 N/A
Perth 1.17 N/A
Source: ACOLA Report (2013), EIA Report (2011)
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Service industry
Currently, the extent of the service industry in terms of drilling and hydro fracturing 
services in Australia is not adequate. The US shale gas success was mainly based 
on the advancements in multi-stage fracturing and horizontal drilling. The US 
has more than 1700 drilling rigs in operation, of which more than 60 per cent are 
horizontal drilling rigs [11]. However, in Australia there are only a handful of drilling 
rigs that can access depths in excess of 3000m, inhibiting the prospects of shale 
gas development immensely. Currently, there is only one permanent drilling rig 
operating at the Canning Basin and in the Cooper Basin only three drilling rigs are 
operating on shale developments. The cost of moving drilling rigs is also substantial. 
Currently, only a limited number of service companies are offering hydraulic 
fracturing services; namely, Halliburton, Baker Hughes and Schlumberger. However, 
shale gas development requires rapid well replacement procedures and many wells 
to be fracced simultaneously. Therefore, these service companies must expand 
their capacity substantially to enable growth of the shale gas industry, or new 
entrants must be attracted to the market.  In a global context, Australian fraccing 
capacity is less than 1 per cent [12]. 
Fraccing fluid is comprised mostly of water (at least 95 per cent); ‘proppants’ 
(to keep fractures propped open allowing trapped oil and gas to escape) and a 
small percentage of chemicals (less than 0.5 per cent). The proppant is usually 
sand or manufactured ceramic balls, the latter is more suited to deep shale in 
order to withstand the considerable crushing pressures. The chemicals used, 
some of which are found in commonly used household products, are required 
to carry the proppant (guar gum), remove bacteria (glutaraldehyde), prevent 
corrosion (methanol), restrict scale formation (hydrochloric acid) and reduce friction 
(polyacrylamide) to enable easier pumping of frac fluid and sand into the well. 
The amount of water used (and produced) in the fraccing of shale formations is 
substantially less than in coal seam gas (CSG) extraction. In the latter, water must 
be removed from the coal seams to reduce pressure and release any gas present. 
In contrast, the very deep shale formations are far removed from groundwater 
aquifers and, hence, do not need to be dewatered. Such rock formations typically 
require 10-20 ML of water per well for fraccing, with 0.04-0.4ML of water required 
per frac stage. A horizontal well may require up to 15 fraccing stages. However, that 
said, wherever fraccing takes place, the water that flows back from the wells after 
fraccing must be collected and, ideally, treated and recycled or, at least, disposed 
of under highly policed environmental practices, including lined pits or tanks. In 
Australia’s remote gas-rich basins, while proper disposal practices are being carried 
out, there are currently, at this early stage of the shale gas industry, few recycling 
facilities. Hence, there is a shortfall in the services for shale gas exploration and 
production necessary if the industry is to expand in the same way as occurred in 
the US. The slow growth of shale gas developments is also affecting the attraction 
of new service companies to the market. 
The lack of skilled personnel is also contributing to increased costs. Currently, 
shale gas drilling and fraccing are more than three times as costly as in the US 
[13]. In addition, the ceramic proppants and guar gum required for deep shale well 
fracturing are currently not manufactured in Australia and, hence, must be imported 
from overseas, mainly from China and India. For a typical single horizontal well, 
fraccing can use anywhere from 1,000 – 10,000 metric tonnes of proppant and 
about 10 metric tonnes of guar gum, so if the shale gas industry is to expand and 
this situation continues, then the import volumes would be considerable. 
4
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4Unlocking shale potential is predominantly based on the enhancement of technologies. Acquiring and fine tuning current technologies are important for Australian shales. Current technologies have mostly been practiced and perfected on North American shales and these technologies need to be customised for Australian shale development. The expansion of the service industry is vital to effectively engage in this development.Pipeline accessDomestic pipeline transport is the most effective means of transporting gas directly 
to either consumers or towards an LNG terminal without any processing. Figure 
3 shows the potential Australian shale plays, along with the existing pipeline 
infrastructure. While the infrastructure in the Cooper Basin is reasonably good, there 
are no pipelines connecting the Canning, Georgina, Pedrika and Officer basins 
to the existing main transmission lines. This is a substantial barrier to shale gas 
development in these regions.
Figure 3 
   Source : AWT International
Access is also constrained by the current regulation regime for pipelines. Most of 
the Australian gas pipelines are regulated through contracted carriage. Therefore, 
access is restricted for new entrants to the markets, as there are only a limited 
number of natural gas transmission pipelines that have been regulated allowing full 
third party access. The Australian Energy Regulator is the regulation authority for 
pipeline access in Australia, except for Western Australia, where it is the Economic 
Regulation Authority. To date, only six out of 14 major eastern gas transmission 
lines, two out of eight major western gas transmission lines and 10 distribution 
networks are fully regulated for third party access [14]. The Australian natural gas 
pipelines are privately owned and usually operated under long-term contracts. 
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Although this long term association is vital to ensure the recovery of pipeline 
investment costs, it deprives access to new entrants. Currently, the natural gas 
pipelines are not utilized to the optimum level, especially with seasonal temperature 
variations [14]. However, for unregulated pipelines, it is at the discretion of already 
contracted companies to decide on subcontracting of any unused pipeline capacity. 
Thus, contract carriage is a barrier to third party access. 
Enviromental lobby
Environmental concerns on hydraulic fracturing have to be addressed to increase 
the confidence on shale gas projects. In Australia, community concerns over both 
fraccing and de-watering have arisen from increased shallow CSG activity on 
agricultural land in QLD and NSW in recent years. However, as mentioned above, 
fraccing of shale gas formations is largely a different process. In South Australia, 
much work is being done to raise awareness of these differences and to work 
with communities to minimize any potential negative environmental impacts. All 
South Australian oil, gas and geothermal activities are regulated under the South 
Australian Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Act 2000 [15] and the Department 
for Manufacturing, Innovation, Trade, Resources and Energy (DMITRE) employs 
a range of technical experts, including drilling engineers, to ensure the necessary 
approval conditions are in place and procedures are strictly adhered to. The 
composition of the fraccing fluids must be reported and risk assessments carried 
out to ensure that there is no risk of contaminating aquifers as a result of fraccing.
There are some misunderstandings in the community surrounding earthquakes 
and fraccing. Although it is true that fraccing operations may cause minor 
seismic activity, these events are rarely even detected by people on the surface. 
Furthermore, greenhouse gas emissions could arise from flow backs and from 
the drilling and fraccing processes. Therefore, operators and regulators need 
to be proactive in order to effectively engage with these community concerns. 
More government funded research needs to be conducted to verify these effects 
and recommend good practice. There are examples of good practice, especially 
in South Australia, which could be replicated elsewhere. The implementation 
of transparent mechanisms disclosing the types of chemicals used during the 
fraccing process and the adherence to well-defined regulatory procedures of well 
construction are important steps to winning community confidence.  
Industry requires both a regulatory licence and a social licence to explore and 
produce. In the light of the impending shale gas revolution, new governance 
approaches need consideration.
In the current context, these four issues – poor geology, lack of a service industry, 
pipeline access and environmental concerns – can be seen as the key ones to be 
addressed if there is to be a shale gas revolution in Australia. However, other issues 
also emerged from the UCL Australia survey, including fraccing regulations, property 
rights, licensing restrictions and lack of investment on research and development. 
As a result, as things stand, Australian shale gas developments may not replicate 
the experience of the US without policy and regulatory measures. However, given 
the resource base, shale gas has the potential to become an important energy 
resource in Australia. Therefore, policy solutions need to be developed to address 
the issues identified here.
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For policy makers there is a distinct “trilemma” of managing energy security and 
creating steady economic growth4, while at the same time addressing climate 
change concerns. This requires a combined effort from the industry, state and 
territory governments and the Australian Government. Policies must be developed 
to ensure that those energy resources with a low greenhouse gas impact, such as 
renewables and natural gas, are prioritized. However, currently there is no policy 
for prioritizing energy resources based on their contribution towards base load 
power for industrial and residential requirements. Such a policy needs to specify 
the role of different energy resources to be utilized in catering for the domestic 
energy demand. Although there is much discussion regarding a transition towards 
renewable energies, there is insufficient capacity to fulfill base load energy demand 
with renewable energies in the immediate future. Therefore, the fossil fuel resources 
cannot be written off, at least not for the next two decades. Natural gas emits only 
about 50 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions when combusted, compared to 
coal. Therefore, due to its availability, and all other things being equal, natural  
gas can be viewed as the optimal energy resource in the transition to a low  
carbon future.
The national greenhouse gas emission target for 2020 is to reduce emissions by 
5 per cent of the levels in 2000 [16]. This will not be achievable unless more gas 
is used for base load power generation. Gas based electricity generation not only 
reduces CO2 emissions by 50 per cent, but also reduces SO2 emissions by 99 
per cent, NOx emissions by 80 per cent and particulate emissions and mercury 
emissions almost by 100 per cent [17]. In 2000, CO2 emissions based on stationary 
sources were estimated to be around 175 Mt out of a total of 565 Mt [18].  If gas-
based power replaces coal-based electricity generation, this would contribute 
significantly to achieving the stated CO2 emission target. Figure 4 illustrates the 
importance of natural gas in reducing greenhouse gas emissions from electricity 
generation. However, the target cannot be achieved solely by switching to gas-fired 
power generation. Energy efficiency improvements and the use of renewable energy 
sources will also be necessary.
Figure 4 
Source: Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency
Chapter 5:  Policy recommendations
4 There is a debate growing over whether Australia (which is facing the prospect of an attack of “re-
source curse”, whereby a dominant natural resource sector causes damage to other sectors of the 
economy, for example, as a result of exchange rate over-valuation) should be further developing its 
natural resources.  This is an important debate, but is not covered in this report.
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Another factor to take into account is that the Australian manufacturing industry is 
facing severe natural gas shortages caused by the increasing commitments of gas 
suppliers to LNG contracts. This is leading to price spikes as manufacturers come 
to renew their long-term gas supply agreements [19]. The call in some quarters 
for a reservation policy for the east coast gas market is controversial and regarded 
by many as an inefficient policy. A more effective policy might be to align local 
manufacturing companies, either individually or as an alliance, with the local shale 
gas operators. However, major shale gas operators with the luxury of contingency 
resources would not find this attractive, as they would prefer international LNG 
contracts with higher returns. It would be of more interest to smaller scale operators 
as they look to de-risk their projects with much needed capital. Such efforts would 
not only help the shale gas industry to prosper, but could also secure much needed 
long term gas supplies to the manufacturing industry. A good example is where 
Orica, a major Australian explosive and commercial blasting company, invested in 
coal seam gas in the southern Cooper Basin with Strike Energy, based on a long-
term gas supply contract of 0.15 tcf over 20 years5 [20]. In the US, shale gas has 
provided a much needed recovery in the manufacturing industry, with the availability 
of lower priced gas, leading to cheaper products and greater competitiveness 
in overseas markets. It is claimed that dedicated gas supply for manufacturing 
industries in Australia could save about 200,000 manufacturing jobs [21]. 
The human capital and skills level for the shale gas industry itself also needs to be 
developed. Currently, only South Australia has proposed a ‘planned development 
approach’ for shale gas, DMITRE publishing the “Roadmap for Unconventional Gas 
Projects in South Australia”, which provides a comprehensive plan to expand the 
industry to recover about 6.0 tcf of gas by 2028 [8]. Queensland is about to embark 
on a similar exercise. By comparing the number of required wells for this expansion 
with the US experience it can be estimated that, for South Australian shale gas 
developments, more than 17,500 jobs could be created (62 jobs per well) [8, 22]. 
Based on these estimates, similar shale gas developments in the other states – 
particularly Western Australia and Queensland – could create up to 100,000 jobs 
nationally. Additionally, there will be more short term employment opportunities 
created in a growing gas industry.  
Geology
Obviously, geology cannot be changed by policy. However good policy can affect 
the commerciality of the geology.
The first option is to improve the fiscal terms given the government, as the owner of 
the sub-soil gas, determines the fiscal system under which companies operate. This 
was an important factor in the US story of shale gas in the early days, with the tax 
breaks for unconventional operations in the Energy Act 1980, in place until 2002.  
More recently, the UK Government has offered what it views as attractive fiscal 
incentives to shale gas operations in the hope of kick-starting the industry. The new 
proposed system acknowledges that there is a slower cost of recovery for shale gas 
5
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projects compared to conventional offshore developments and that costs are often 
spread over a much wider area than a traditional oil or gas field6. In Australia, the 
new Australian Government has announced an exploration development incentive 
scheme will be implemented from July 2014 to increase mineral exploration 
activities. This scheme will enable investors to deduct mineral exploration expenses 
against their own taxable incomes [23].
Another policy contribution for government to improve the commerciality of the 
geology would be to fund basic scientific research relating to shale gas operations, 
again following the government of the US. The sort of research envisaged is into 
fundamental science. Scientific research has certain characteristics that make it 
a “public good”7 and, hence, should not be carried out by private companies. No 
private company would fund Isaac Newton to sit under his apple tree in order to 
“discover” gravity.  Although gravity is a key scientific building block at the centre 
of Western science it has no commercial value and, indeed, once “discovered”, 
cannot be patented to allow the funder to recover their financial outlay.   For 
example, when ExxonMobil withdrew from Poland in March 2012, the CEO 
explained that the technology used so successfully in the US was simply not 
working on the Polish geology.  He went on to say that much more research was 
needed to make the technology work. Potentially, this remains a serious barrier to 
developing shale gas in Europe. One promising sign of this in Australia was that 
late in 2011, the Australian Government established an expert scientific committee 
to examine water-related impacts from coal bed methane, funded with A$150m 
over four years. Certainly Australia has the scientific capabilities to undertake such 
scientific research. 
Shale gas service industry
The Australian shale gas industry has the potential to grow in a similar manner 
to the industry in the US. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, there are an 
insufficient number of companies able to service this expansion, with only a handful 
currently involved in shale gas operations. Innovative policies are required to 
attract more service companies into the market. It would be possible to encourage 
the development of a service industry for drilling and fraccing by offering a more 
attractive tax regime, possibly by altering capital allowances and depreciation 
terms to such companies. Domestic production of fraccing materials could also be 
encouraged.
The US shale gas revolution benefitted from operators and service companies 
working together as an alliance, sharing infrastructure and vital technological 
enhancements. This has decreased the cost of developments significantly. 
Pad drilling, improved fraccing mechanisms and improved rig mobility are such 
developments, leading to increased efficiency and growth [24]. As a result, though 
the number of operating rigs is reducing, the number of wells fracced is significantly 
6 The UK government proposed the following two tax incentives to cover these concerns.  First, the so-
called “pad allowance”, which is tax on a proportion of income generated from producing shale gas that 
will be reduced from 62 per cent to 30 per cent for the lifetime of the shale well. Second, the “Ring Fence 
Expenditure Supplement” for shale gas projects will be extended from six to 10 accounting periods.
7 Public goods are goods or services whose consumption is non-rival and where exclusion from using it 
is not feasible. Non-rival consumption means there is no supply curve and non-exclusion means there is 
no demand curve.  Absent supply and demand curves mean that there can be no price and therefore the 
private market cannot effectively allocate resources to produce the good.  Conventionally, the government 
allocating resources to the production of the good or service solves this problem.
5
22 of 32
rising [25]. There is also an influx of horizontal well rigs replacing vertical drill rigs. 
Simultaneously, the drilling and completion costs have also reduced by more than 
30 per cent [25]. Information sharing is key for new entrants to the market, as they 
will become more efficient more quickly. As an example, in the US the Marcellus 
shale coalition consists of 300 partnering operators and service companies and has 
led to an exponential increase in production within a shorter time span. It has also 
helped to push the industry up the technological learning curve at a faster rate.
Australian shale gas operators would mutually benefit working together as an 
alliance. However, the number of operators in Australian shale basins is far fewer 
compared to the US. Currently, only about 20 shale gas companies are operating 
in the six identified Australian shale basins within an area in excess of 900,000 km2. 
In the Marcellus shale play alone there are more than 90 operators within a 10,000 
km2 area [26]. There is a significant participation of smaller scale independent 
operators, rather than the major operators.
Comparatively, the leased acreage area is significantly higher in Australia than in 
the US. Hence, existing leased acreage permits could also become a significant 
barrier to attracting new operators into the market. Some basins are leased to only 
a handful of operators, with activity at a very low level, particularly in the Canning 
Basin. This is not beneficial for the current operators, given that they will have 
to bear the cost of infrastructure individually. New Standard Energy, operating in 
the Canning Basin, has had to construct two airstrips and a 500 km access road 
costing more than A$10 million, just to provide access to two exploration wells 
[27]. Furthermore, processing facilities and pipelines for transportation during 
the production phase will also be required. Such costs are significantly affecting 
the company’s share price and, hence, its ability to expand. Collective funding of 
such important infrastructure would lower the capital cost burden on the small 
number of operators. More participation would expedite the development process. 
Therefore, government intervention is critical to relinquish land where original work 
programmes are not being adhered to and to release smaller plots to encourage 
new entrants to the industry. New Federal Industry Minister Ian Macfarlane has 
threatened to revoke retention rights of operators who shelve their projects (“use it 
or lose it”) [28]. This is an important signal to off and onshore gas projects. Similarly, 
governments might also be in a position to encourage cooperation between 
companies by a helpful interpretation of competition policy.
It is worth pointing out that given the growing interest in shale gas in Asia more 
widely, the development of a shale gas service industry of any scale would 
potentially also be a major export earner for Australia in the years to come. While 
it is true that the major service companies, almost entirely American, are already 
involved in Asia, the prospect of competition from other companies would be most 
welcome by Asian customers. The classic example of this was the Norwegian 
decision in the early 1970s to use the discovery of North Sea oil to develop a world 
class Norwegian oil service industry.
5
23 of 32
Pipeline access
A key part of the shale gas story in the US was the ease with which gas producers 
could get access to gas markets, both in terms of transportation and in terms 
of negotiating sales contracts.  For transport this is because access to the very 
comprehensive gas grid is based on common carriage. Thus, even if the local 
pipeline is full to capacity, a gas producer can still gain access to some proportion 
of the capacity as other users must reduce throughput on a pro rata basis. In 
Europe, by contrast, access is by third party access. If the pipeline is full, no access 
is possible. In addition, in terms of trading gas, the US is a commodity supply 
market.  Thus, there are a large number of buyers and sellers and there is clear 
transparency on price.  This is in contrast to a project supply market, where there 
are few buyers and sellers and there is limited price transparency.
Both the transportation and trading of gas are directly subject to government 
regulation. A good example of what can be achieved using regulation as a lever to 
ensure access is the oil pipeline networks in the UK North Sea.  There, access is 
based on third party access. If the pipeline owner claims the line is at full capacity, 
there can be no access.  Early in the 1990s the UK government made it clear to 
the pipeline owners that they were determined to maximize recovery of oil from 
the North Sea. This required them to do all they could to allow access for new 
developments and not to try and restrict access “unreasonably”.  It was made clear 
that failure to do so would result in the use of legislation, much of which was already 
in existence, to force access and penalize those creating barriers to entry. This 
proved sufficient to ensure access. 
The Australian gas market was deregulated in 1997 and liberalized to enable 
third party access and thereby increase competitiveness [29].  However, although 
the specific objective of the Australian National Gas Act is “to promote efficient 
investment in, and efficient operation and use of, natural gas services for the long-
term interests of consumers of natural gas with respect to price, quality, safety, 
reliability and security of supply of natural gas”, there is no guaranteed pipeline 
access for new entrants to the market [30]. As with contract carriage there is no 
obligation to subcontract any unutilized capacity if not fully covered under the 
regulations for third party access. Thus, the current system does not obligate the 
pipeline owners to accommodate new entrants or the existing capacity to be shared 
among the applicants on a pro rata basis.  Implementing a common carriage policy 
and a voluntary pipeline capacity-trading scheme based on the unused pipeline 
capacities would simplify the access for everyone.  
The implementation of a common access policy will help to create a competitive 
wholesale gas market along the lines of the US experience [31]. However, 
transferring from contract carriage to common carriage can only be based on 
demand, since there is only limited opportunity for competition at this stage in terms 
of emerging shale plays and there is insufficient demand to implement a voluntary 
trading scheme and a common access policy. Such policies could simplify the gas 
transactions with enhanced transparency and reliability. Gas transactions could be 
simplified further by having a uniform tariff structure based on the distance and the 
quantity of gas shipped. These strategies will encourage new gas developers and 
retailers to be involved in upstream and downstream gas markets. Thus, increased 
market competition will not only decrease the bargaining dominance of major 
producers and retailers, but will also decrease the gas price. All of this enhances the 
commerciality of shale gas projects.
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8 For example see the special report by the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering in the UK 
Shale gas extraction in the UK: A review of hydraulic fracturing published in June 2012.
5 Enviromental concernsCommunity acceptance is vital to secure and maintain shale gas operations, given that any moratorium on fraccing would restrict shale gas development. It is important to ensure there is an effective and robust regulatory framework in place to mitigate any concerns. Under the existing system the regulatory regime covering upstream oil and gas is shared between Australian, state and territory governments and local authorities. However, while there is an extensive body of regulations, most are not specific to oil and gas and even less so for shale gas operations. Hence, greater transparency and clarity would be aided by a specific 
regulatory regime for shale gas operations and fraccing. While many may argue that 
the existing regulatory regime is sufficient, this was a key recommendation of the 
Royal Society/Royal Academy of Engineering (see footnotes 8 and 9). In particular, 
attention needs to be paid to the quality of well completion and the treatment of 
waste fraccing water.  At the very least such a regime, if strictly enforced, would 
do much to address any concerns of local communities proximate to the shale 
gas operations. Where there are examples of good practice, for instance, in South 
Australia, these should be recognized and adopted more widely across Australia. 
The rapid expansion of CSG operations in some States has created significant 
public concern over access issues and possible environmental damage, especially 
in the context of water drawdown, contamination and wastewater disposal. Without 
proper controls and regulations, this could feed into negative attitudes towards shale 
gas operations.
At the same time as developing a regulatory regime specifically for shale, the 
government at all levels needs to develop a credible public relations campaign.  
Most of the scientific evidence suggests that there need not be any significant 
environmental impacts associated with fraccing8, but this is not sufficient to 
persuade many concerned locals. Already such concerns forced Victoria in August 
2012 to introduce a moratorium for fraccing for CSG. More research is needed on 
the extent of fugitive methane emissions that are gathering increased attention as a 
source of greenhouse gases.  Concern on this issue is rising on the agenda and will 
need to be addressed by research to establish the levels of emissions and possible 
measures to reduce them if they are at concerning levels.
In addition to regulatory licensing, there is a general understanding that industry 
needs to obtain a social license to operate. There is also a perceived lack of 
transparency in relation to strategic planning by governments in the development 
of unconventional gas resources. Governments may generally have embraced 
new governance framework approaches, for instance, as with corporate social 
responsibility. However, there continues to be failures.  Without broad community 
support, it may not be possible to fully exploit the resources.
Ascertaining what is required for community acceptance (rights, evidence, 
collaboration, duties, monitoring and enforcement) and whether a social contract 
or other form of understanding is sufficient or whether legislative underpinning is 
required will be a crucial step in developing appropriate governance frameworks. 
Consideration needs to be given as to whether present laws are sufficient and, if 
not, the nature of new models that might be necessary. 
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A policy of public disclosure of the chemicals used would help reduce public 
concerns on hydraulic fracturing. The IEA has actually suggested the disclosure 
of fraccing fluid additives and volumes to be made a mandatory requirement [4]. 
In the US, Wyoming became the first State to enact such regulation, disclosing 
the composition of fraccing fluids on a well-by-well basis [32]. The well-by-well 
disclosure is necessary as the companies vary fluid composition depending on the 
conditions.  Subsequently, this has led to voluntary disclosure of fraccing fluids. The 
FracFocus website was launched in 2011 for companies to declare composition 
of fraccing fluids on a voluntary basis for any US well [33]. In Australia, there is 
no mandatory requirement to publicly disclose composition of the fraccing fluids. 
However, the implementation of such policies leading to increased transparency is 
key to engage with community concerns.
It is important to convey the message to communities about the economic potential 
which could flow from shale gas operations and at the same time educate them 
about shale gas extraction practices. Currently, there are numerous negative 
messages about shale gas operations, many of which ignore the existing scientific 
evidence. Shale gas operators could take part in public awareness campaigns to 
reduce the negative perception on shale gas activities. For example, the EIR report 
published by Beach Energy (2012) is an effort to demonstrate how their operations 
minimise impacts on the environment by working within the legislative frameworks 
[34].  Another, perhaps even more effective step would be to enable universities and 
research institutes to participate in community engagement, given the large body 
of scientific evidence in existence on the impacts of fraccing9. Governments and 
shale gas operators need to be proactive in reaching out to affected communities 
to address their concerns and must be accountable and approachable in terms of 
such concerns. They also must accept responsibility for local community impacts 
due to shale gas development. There are examples of good practice, but more 
needs to be done.
Policies leading to increased community engagement and participation will help to 
promote the confidence in shale gas development projects. Currently, landowners 
do not have the incentives of ownership of hydrocarbon resources to encourage 
them to facilitate surface access for shale gas operations. Short of changing the 
underlying property rights along the lines used in the US, it would be possible to 
legislate that companies producing shale must “compensate” local communities 
for the disruption from shale gas operations and include them in the economic 
benefits of the project.  To be fair, many companies are already making serious 
attempts to do this and there are existing regulatory measures, in relation to oil 
and gas operations in general, that require companies to provide compensation to 
landowners. For instance, in Queensland, there is an environmental offset fund to 
which resource companies must contribute. However, without consistent, specific 
and transparent regulation and monitoring, such efforts will do little to achieve the 
desired outcomes. 
A good example of such a mechanism is the Shetland Charitable Trust. Initially 
money came to Shetland by way of the Disturbance Act 1974 to compensate for 
the disturbances arising as a result of the building and operation of the Sullom Voe 
Terminal from 1972-74. The funds were initially around £2 million and amounted 
9 For example see the report in the UK on hydraulic fracturing from the Royal Society and the Royal Academy 
of Engineers published in June 2012.
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to more than £81 million by 2000 when they stopped. Other funds came from a 
per barrel royalty paid for every barrel loaded at Sullom Voe. At its peak the fund 
amounted to £250 million, but the valuation has fluctuated significantly over the 
years as a result of stock market booms and busts. Spending decisions are at 
the discretion of the trustees and money has been spent on numerous projects, 
including supporting traditional industries such as agriculture and fisheries, but also 
projects aimed to improve the quality of life of the population though social need, 
leisure, environment and education. Money has also been spent on providing care 
homes and respite centres for the elderly. In an attempt to create something similar 
to this, the UK Government recently announced a compensation scheme specific 
to shale gas operations in an attempt to assuage local opposition.  Under this 
scheme, local communities will receive £100,000 per well drilled (although some 
reports indicate this will be per well site), plus 1 per cent of the revenues.
In Australia, the Multiple Land Use Framework (MLUF) is being proposed as a 
crucial step in overcoming issues arising from investment in resources exploration 
and development [35]. The MLUF is aimed at achieving four main outcomes: 
a. A shared commitment between the minerals and petroleum sector and   
 regulators on multiple and sequential land uses; 
b. Better informed public discourse; 
c. Merit-based land access decisions; and
d. Better outcomes for affected communities and land holders.
The MLUF framework includes nine components and eight guiding principles (Figure 
5). The components include leadership, planning, partnerships, engagement, 
education, sharing and collaboration. The guiding principles have to be embodied 
into the thought process of governments, community and industry in land use 
planning, policy and development. Thus, it is hoped that the MLUF will provide an 
effective platform to engage with community concerns on shale gas development. 
However, full implementation will require universal agreement and adoption by all 
land users, which may be difficult to achieve in practice.  
The MLUF platform recognises the importance of effective collaborative leadership 
by government, industry and community. Early engagement with stakeholders is 
also recognised as being crucial. Effective planning, partnerships and education 
are given a high priority. Transparency, accountability and consistency are to be 
maintained with assessment and approvals. Applied learning would lead to more 
informed decisions, with collaboration and data sharing to be encouraged among 
operators. Simultaneously, the guiding principle of coexistence is aimed at ensuring 
the rights of land users are respected. However, the integration of a community 
benefit scheme based on the generated income would have improved the MLUF 
concept further. Local community incentive schemes based on infrastructure 
development and employment are crucial to secure social license to operate. 
Without an obligation, local community development will be at the discretion of  
the operators.
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6 Australia clearly has the potential to make shale gas an important source of energy in the future.  However, there are barriers to the creation of a significant shale gas industry if that is what the country desires.  The important barriers appear to be limits from the geology, the lack of an adequate service industry, access to existing gas pipelines and markets, and, finally, the need to deal with concerns about the environmental impacts of shale gas operations.  All of these barriers can be positively influenced by government policy at State and Territory and Federal levels.  
Chapter 6:  Conclusions
If Australia wants a shale gas revolution, the commerciality of the geology 
needs to be improved by making the fiscal systems governing upstream 
shale gas operations more attractive.  This can also be achieved by a 
concerted effort to make greater use of research and development into the 
technology of low permeability operations.  
Policy should also encourage the development of a shale gas service 
industry to drill the wells and hydraulically fracture the structures. 
Such policies could range from fiscal breaks to the encouragement of 
greater cooperation among the operators and the service industry. The 
development of such an industry could prove to be a major benefit to the 
Australian economy as shale gas interest in Asia grows.  
As for access to pipelines and gas markets, this is very much in the hands 
of the regulatory authorities.  Moving towards the sort of system that 
underpins the US gas market would be a major step forward that would 
dramatically improve the commerciality of many shale gas operations. This 
would involve the greater use of common carriage as the basis for pipeline 
access and a review of the whole gas contracting system.
The environmental concerns are all amenable to policy influence.  There 
needs to be a specific regulatory system for shale gas operations, focusing 
on issues such as well completion, the use of fraccing fluids, levels of 
fugitive methane emissions and the management of waste water. There 
also needs to be a concerted science-based campaign to counter many of 
the unfounded claims being made regarding shale gas operations.
Ascertaining what is required for community acceptance (rights, evidence, 
collaboration, duties, monitoring and enforcement) and whether a social 
contract or other form of understanding is sufficient or whether legislative 
underpinning is required will be a crucial step in developing appropriate 
governance frameworks for the shale and CSG industries. Consideration 
needs to be given as to whether present laws are sufficient and, if not, the 
nature of new models that might be necessary. 
•
•
•
•
•
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